'Nationalism' or 'national communism' likewise appear unsatisfactory upon closer examination: on the one hand the SED regime, and no doubt much of its following, perceived itself as the truly patriotic German state. For an East German intellectual of the 1950s, the Ulbricht regime's agitation in the name of the German nation needed be no less credible than its agitation in the name of Marxism. On the other hand, the 'National Communist' regimes of Poland, or later Slovakia, were as successful in quelling intellectual dissent as in supporting it. Moreover, intellectuals in Poland or Hungary in 1956 considered their actions to be carried out in the name of socialism as much as in the name of their nations. 9 This essay hopes to reach a more balanced understanding of East German intellectuals in the 1950s by placing them in their context: that is by seeing them against the background of other socialist states in the region. It argues that two factors truly distinguished East Germany's intellectuals: the SED leadership's unique attention to the challenges of creating a new elite, 10 and an intellectual culture marked by primary loyalty to the Party/state. Counterparts elsewhere in East Central Europe identified primarily with an historical formation called the 'intelligentsia '. 11 Any intelligentsia in the GDR. was a creation of the SED, however, and it had been formed in both positive and negative senses. On the one hand the SED consciously chose members of the new intelligentsia, and on the other it acted to exclude the influence of 'bourgeois' or 'reactionary' elements through repression and an open border to the West.
The understanding of intellectuals used here is a broad one, including writers and artists, but also university communities and especially students.
12 Students have been known throughout East Central Europe for their role in pressing for change at critical moments. Everywhere, that is, except in East Germany.
Early Challenges and Early Policies
The Soviet Military Administration in Germany and its German (SMAG) Communist helpers were determined from the immediate post-war days to influence decisively the emergence of a new intelligentsia on German soil. They were equally determined to hinder intellectual dissent. This is most visible in university policy. 13 In the summer of 1945 the professorial bodies of all six universities of the Soviet 9 Aczel and Meray, Revolt; Peter Raina, Political Opposition in Poland (London: Poets and Painters Press, 1978) , 39-44; Andrzej Friszke, Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945 -1980 (London: Aneks, 1994 Several scholars have posited the SED's comparative success in transforming elites. Meuschel, Legitimation, 128-9; Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949 -1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 , 81. 
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Zone had re-convened and begun to purge themselves of former Nazis, but the new authorities proved very suspicious of these efforts. Conflicts ensued over precise numbers, with the universities insisting that certain professors had to be maintained in order to guarantee basic university functions. The Soviets responded to German obstinance with an order in early 1946 that every former Nazi be removed from teaching staffs, something the Germans -and Western powersconsidered fantastic.
14 The rectors of Rostock, Leipzig and Berlin were replaced by more compliant colleagues; and the rector of Greifswald, the theologian Ernst Lohmeyer, was arrested the day before the scheduled university re-opening in January 1946. He was never heard from again.
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As a result of this de-Nazification the number of university teachers active in the Soviet Zone dropped by over two-thirds. 16 This was the most decisive break in professorial continuity in East Central Europe, for the purges touched every faculty. The Czech purges of 1948 were severe, but left medical and natural science faculties essentially intact. 17 It was also the earliest point at which Communist authorities in
East Centra] Europe began forming a new intelligentsia. Soviet or German Communist agencies had to approve not only the hiring of every new university teacher, but also the admittance of each new student. Soviet and German Communists co-operated 18 in student admissions policies, which were seen as the groundwork for building a new academic elite. According to guidelines of early 1948, the goal of worker courses was the 'formation of the next generation of academics from such strata of the people (workers, peasants, victims of fascism and victims of national socialism) as have been excluded from high school for social or political reasons'. 19 Early in 1946, special faculties were set up throughout the Soviet Zone to prepare worker and peasant children for university. Previously, people from such social strata had been all but denied entrance to university. Through a process of trial and error the SED devised methods of selection and teaching that guaranteed strong contingents of students from these social strata who would succeed at university. The East On the purging, see Mitchell G. Ash, 'Denazifying Scientists -and Science', in M. Judt and B. Ciesla, (eds.), Technology Transfer out of Germany after 1945 , (Chur, 1995 .
Marianne and Egon Erwin Miiller, '. . . stiirmt die Festung Wissenschaft!' Die Sowjetisierung der mitteldeutschen Universitaten seit 1945 (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1953 , 65; Universitatsarchiv Greifswald, personnel file Emst Lohmeyer. 1946-66 1949-54 1945-55 peasant faculties became the most serious in the region (see Table 1 ) and, indeed, outdid even the Soviet variant in consistency of application. Soviet and East German Communists complemented these affirmative action policies with a careful ideological policing of university terrains. At first they may have harboured some belief that such policing would not be necessary given that student admissions policies were meant to screen students tainted by fascist ideology. In 1946 the SMAG even permitted student councils to emerge throughout the Zone. Yet students did not behave as expected: in two freely contested elections in 1947 they elected liberals and Christian Democrats. The SMAG responded with changes in election procedures, and growing terror: over 400 students and professors were arrested in East Germany between 1945 and mid-1953. 22 Students of the immediate post-war years proved to be the group in East German society least willing to accept the increasingly authoritarian regime, and thereby reinforced the determination of the SMAG and SED to direct the formation of a new intelligentsia.
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Such determination extended to the top tiers of the leadership, and in this the SED was extraordinary. There are no records of Klement Gottwald, Rudolf Slansky, Wtadyslaw Gomulka or Boleslaw Bierut intervening in favour of worker studies at any point. 24 Walter Ulbricht, on the other hand, constantly involved himself in the formation of the new elite: from Marxist-Leninist schooling to special legal training, stipends, sport instruction, recruiting of women and, of course, the worker-peasant faculties. In 1950, he personally adjusted the numbers of The Soviet model for such courses, the rabfak, was used intensively only in the early postrevolutionary period and during the Great Break , 1945 ', Central European History, Vol. 28, no. 3 (1995 . worker-peasant students to be admitted, demanding that they be increased threefold. 25 At least in part due to this decisive central will, the SED apparatus was likewise keenly interested in elite-building, and maintained the constant pressure on trade union, youth (FDJ) or basic party cells necessary to direct the ideological and technical education of young cadres. The results are readily apparent in a comparative glance at student recruitment and stipends (Tables 2 and 3) . SED functionaries had been troubled by a significant presence of students who did not 'belong to us', that is, students of bourgeois background.
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They learned that the most efficient way of binding students to the Party was through scholarships. Students who became materially dependent on the Party tended to behave loyally. The wisdom of this policy was shown in 1956 when trouble tended to emanate from groups not dependent upon stipends, such as future veterinarians. In 1958/9 all East German worker-peasant students (55.1 per cent of the total) received full scholarships; the remaining scholarship holders received a two-thirds stipend. In Poland, at the same time, thirty-nine per cent of students received a full stipend and 4.7 per cent a partial stipend. 43 There was in Poland and Czechoslovakia additional scholarship aid from enterprises, but nowhere was the state so directly responsible for student welfare as in East Germany. The East German Party had been most careful to bind students into a web of dependency and obligation. There were relatively more taken from the lowest social groups; they were given the longest and most expensive pre-university preparation and the highest state stipends, and were made to join Communist organisations. As early as the winter term 1946/7, close to one-third of the students of the Soviet Zone of Occupation were SED members. 44 All of this formed the basis for a highly effective system of reward and punishment. they had not shown enough vigour in opposing strikers and demonstrators. 53 In only a few cases were students reported as having joined strike committees; in many more they had worked to keep production going. 34 During a 1954 retrospective, the State Secretary for Higher Education, Gerhard Harig, recommended expanding worker-peasant education, because the 'overwhelming majority' of students had acted 'exemplarily' during the challenges of the previous year.
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The Party also treated the older generation of intellectuals with a mixture of suppression and coddling. Faced with restrictions on scholarship and often with the threat of arrest, leading 'bourgeois' social scientists like Hans Freyer, Walter Hallstein, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Eduard Spranger, Theodor Litt and Hans Leisegang had emigrated by 1948. Those who remained were gradually joined by a distinguished group of leftist intellectuals including Walter Markov, Hans Mayer, Ernst Bloch, Hermann Budzislawski and Wieland Herzfelde. As is well known, many of the most celebrated German writers also chose to live in the East. If they remained loyal, intellectuals in East Germany could be treated to salaries that exceeded a worker's fifty-fold. 56 In addition, university professors retained substantial powers within their institutes. These facts may have desensitised them to contradictions in the world around them. 57 In Poland, by contrast, the bounty could not be spread so thickly; most professors were forced to hold several jobs just to make ends meet. 58 Professon in the Czech Lands were so neglected that Soviet advisors had to encourage the authorities to raise their salaries so that progress might be made in filling vacant slots. 59 In the GDR, policies towards students and
The SED higher education functionary Franz X. Wohlgemuth reported at the first rectors conference after 17 June that 'there have been no disorders [Unruhen] at any universities'. BAAP, R3/ 1538/30. In Halle there were some extraordinary cases of students taking part in demonstrations, but 'in general one can say that the university and its members showed their good side during the events of 17 June 1953'. In Berlin, many students 'show[ed] a positive attitude either by turning away from the demonstrations, or by discussing with the demonstrators instead of joining them'. BAAP R3/147/28-34-54 Huschner,'Der 17. Juni', 690-1. Speech of 5 July 1954, in Hans-Joachim Lammel (ed.), Dokumente zur Ceschkhte der Arbeiter-undBauem-Fakultaten der DDR, II: 1949 -1966 (Berlin: Institut fur Hochschulbildung, 1988 By January 1952, over 14,000 'individual contracts' of up to 20,000 marks monthly had been concluded with 'members of the intelligentsia'. The average monthly wage in the GDR at that time was 308 marks. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, 'Die Durchsetzung des Marxismus-Leninismus in der Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR (1945 DDR ( -1961 professors ultimately merged, as in the 1970s the graduates of worker-peasant faculties began populating teaching staffs.
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As with students, the older generation of intellectuals behaved passively or loyally during the 1953 crisis. Leading figures of the 1956 intellectual challenge to the SED even welcomed the Soviet forces. Bertold Brecht cheered from his balcony as Soviet tanks entered the Friedrichstrasse. Economist Fritz Behrens ordered a tram driver to remove a 'provocative flag' from his vehicle before allowing the ride to commence. In many cases, professors acted to secure university buildings.
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Bloch's son Jan Robert recalled that his father and other beacons of opposition to the SED failed to become seriously interested in the workers' uprising of 17 June.
62
Former emigres from Nazi Germany were highly suspicious of spontaneous mass street activity. Bloch's friend, the professor of literature Hans Mayer, saw in the demonstrators not workers but a fascist mob: 'In 1933 or 1938 the murderers wore brownshirts. Now they wear Wild West costumes.'
63
The Interrupted Thaw
Despite the evident success of its policies towards the intelligentsia injune 1953, the regime could not continue as if nothing had happened. Intellectuals had behaved passively at worst, but they were not entirely content. There had been expressions of understanding, if not solidarity, for workers and, more importantly, of desires for greater freedom in research and writing. 64 Professors bemoaned the growing regimentation of scientific research and the difficulties of attending conferences in the West. Students likewise criticised reforms which had imposed a set schedule of classes and robbed them of summer holidays. Massive suppression of tiny Protestant youth groups in 1952 also gave rise to a general feeling of unease.
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The SED's response to the dissatisfaction among intellectuals was a more liberal 'New Course' in cultural affairs. The Party permitted relatively open and critical discussions at universities throughout the summer of 1953. For example, a meeting of university rectors in July could demand that the government respect its own laws. The new atmosphere absorbed the intellectuals' grievances but, more importantly, it provided SED hardliners a chance to regroup, with Soviet endorsement. Whereas the Soviets had driven a wedge in the Hungarian leadership after Stalin's death, the events of 17 June convinced them that only Ulbricht could maintain order in East Germany, and therefore they supported his position.
Internal party reports noted that a 'fundamental improvement of Party work took place after the [summer] holidays ' of 1953. 67 By early 1954, the more daring voices of criticism had fallen silent, accused of insisting on 'discussions of mistakes ' (Fehlerdiskussioneri) . Organisations of young Christians again came under heavy fire, though without the deafening barrages of 1952. The Party proceeded more quietly, and also more effectively. Rather than permitting semi-independent discussion clubs to emerge within the Party, the leadership pulled tight 'transmission belts' such as the 'Cultural Union for Democratic Rebirth' (Kulturbund), which 'organised' 170,000 intellectuals and artists. In February 1954, the second secretary of the Kulturbund, former Gulag inmate Erich Wendt, affirmed that intellectuals could not be denied the right to association, but it was better that they meet at the Kulturbund rather than 'in pubs, tea parlours or with Kaffeekrdnzen ... in the old caste spirit'. 
and the Students
The SED leadership felt such confidence in its students that it even dared provoke them. In 1955, the ancient medical faculty of Greifswald University was informed that it would be converted into a military medical academy. Students who chose to remain would become army officers. Soon after this announcement, rumours of a strike began to circulate around the university. Yet, before any would-be dissenter could lift a finger, the SED called the medical students to the university's main hall for a 'meeting' with Mecklenburg's SED boss, Karl Mewis. As the 'meeting' was about to start, Mewis alleged that a student had struck him, and used this 'provocation' to trigger the mechanisms of repression. Over 250 students were quickly transferred from the university auditorium to a nearby jail. Most were released gradually over the next few days and weeks, but several students who had For the SED leadership, it was not enough to have stifled dissent where it emerged. Rumours of the planned strike in Greifswald had floated throughout the East German university world, and provided the SED with an occasion to impose even greater control. At the beginning of the summer term, authorities at East Berlin's Humboldt University decided to make an example of one student who had spoken critically about the Greifswald affair. He was put on trial by the university Party leadership, and saved only by the resourcefulness of his professor. But the 'example' had been made.
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Despite such aggressive policies, 1956 became a year of consternation for the Ulbricht leadership. It could not sense how far the de-Stalinisation inaugurated at the Twentieth Party Congress would go. For a brief period, the unity of the leadership itself seemed to be in question. Leading functionaries Ernst Wollweber (security), Karl Schirdewan (cadres), Kurt Hager (ideology) and Paul Wandel (culture) are all thought to have favoured some degree of liberalisation. Before the final showdown in Budapest, Otto Grotewohl even promised artists greater freedom and students some revision of the obligation to learn Russian. 77 Ulbricht may have felt particularly uncomfortable because he had kept faith with Stalinism to the last. He was therefore careful to circumscribe the effects of Khrushchev's condemnations. Resolutions were prepared announcing that there had never been a 'cult of personality' in East Germany.
78 Ulbricht even chided younger comrades who had gone too far in their devotion to Stalin, for example by learning his writings by heart. He neglected to mention that they had done so under his direction.
Such prevarications enraged the SED faithful at the universities, and mid-to late 1956 became a time of intense discussion. Because of scant East German media coverage of events in the Soviet Union, East German Communist intellectuals found themselves doing what was once unthinkable: tuning into Western news broadcasts. Such direct access made them some of the best informed intellectuals in East Central Europe. In May the secret police (Stasi) reported that:
At almost all universities heated and extensive discussions of the Twentieth Party Congress are taking place. . . . There was, however, a noticeable failure among the students of many faculties (e.g. the institutes of the philosophical faculty in Leipzig) to give priority to deliberating the harmfulness of the cult of personality; rather, students were out for sensation, and eagerly noted and discussed all published mentions of Stalin's mistakes.
Students hoped that a change of leadership would take place in the SED as it had in other East European parties, yet unlike counterparts in Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava or Budapest, they failed to demand solutions to more than specifically student grievances: too much Russian language, compulsory instruction in Despite their carefully limited character, the SED leadership took challenges from students seriously, and even in this time of uncertainty attempted to stifle hints of disagreement, whether serious or farcical. Imagining that they might take advantage of the more open atmosphere, several hundred students of the Music Academy in Weimar staged a mock demonstration in the centre of the town, protesting about the music of the popular folk singer Herbert Roth, whom they satirised as a 'serious danger for true folk music'. Their 'demonstration' was quickly suppressed and an investigation was launched to find the supposed instigators. The matter even reached the Politbureau, where Walter Ulbricht lamented that 'no one could find out' who had put up the notice on the bulletin board calling for this demonstration. 'This shows that the enemy can surprise us right in the centre of our own country, and we know nothing about it.' 81 The summer vacation interrupted the formation of oppositional sentiments among students. Yet soon after they returned to university in the autumn, the Stasi reported 'agitated discussions' of the events occurring in Poland and Hungary. Students mocked the government's restrictions on the flow of information from Poland, for example by confiscating copies of an East Berlin newspaper which had prominently featured Gomutka and part of his acceptance speech. The Stasi observed students getting first-hand knowledge of events in Poland at East Berlin's Polish cultural centre and students of Slavic languages translating news fron Trybuna Lu&u? 1 Yet open and organised activity was almost entirely limited to the medical and veterinary faculties. These were the faculties with the fewest worker-peasant students, and the most 'bourgeois professors' who could still provide students with 'traditional role models'. The threatened withdrawal of scholarships may have pacified students of other faculties, but these 'bourgeois' students often had alternative sources of income. For example, veterinary students could earn money by taking part in immunisation campaigns. Their subjects of study had also been among the most resistant to ideological penetration. 83 students was the Soviet-style method of instruction, which kept students of differing specialisations apart. Thus it was possible for students of Kantorowicz's Institute of German Literature in Berlin to support a resolution condemning the actions of students in the medical faculty.
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But even medical students did not intend to mount a political challenge. In the last week of October their activities climaxed in their demands for an end to Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, Russian language instruction and the Soviet-style ten-month academic year, as well as for the right to matriculate freely and form independent student representation. The only demand that transcended direct student concerns was for more open media coverage.
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The sole attempts at public demonstrations originated in Berlin's medical faculty. On 24 October, shortly after Gomulka's accession to power in Poland and at the beginning of the armed conflict in Hungary, there was a call to a protest march at Marx-Engels Platz. Ulbricht, perhaps heartened by reports of Soviet intervention in Hungary, now recovered his determination. The students never reached the wouldbe demonstration, because the SED leader had them incarcerated for two days in the university building where they had been debating.
These efforts at intimidation were not immediately successful, however. On 3 November, students meeting at the veterinary faculty demanded an end to Russian language and 'social science' instruction, an expanded student exchange within Germany, unrestricted travel and better access to Western scientific literature. Students called for a march to proceed from the border with West Berlin to the nearby State Secretariat for Higher Education. About 1,000 would-be demonstrators met at the appointed hour, but instead of taking their demands eastwards, they were pushed back into West Berlin by the People's Police. This was only the most visible manifestation of a pervasive phenomenon: namely, the draining of East German protest potential to the West. This proved to be the last open expression of dissent among students. News of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising caused a sea change in East German politics as, in the words of Erich Loest, 'from one week to the next functionaries rediscovered the certain old hardness and hard old certainty of their language and arguments'.
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Large contingents of'workers" militias accompanied SED leaders to meetings with students in Berlin in the first days of November; when the 'workers" turn came to speak they thundered their 'outrage' at the students' demands; the 'workers' after all had made university education possible to begin with. In a meeting with Berlin's academic senate on 3 November, Kurt Hager complained of the difficulty he had in holding back workers who wanted to 'beat up' (zusammenschlagen) students. 87 After this, several small student discussion groups emerged in Jena, Halle and Magdeburg which were systematically destroyed in the closing years of the decade. 
'Revisionism'
The most significant intellectual challenge emerged only after the Ulbricht regime recovered its sense of mission in the wake of the Hungarian revolution. The challenge emanated from young Party members associated with the cultural journal Sonntag, the Aufbau publishing house, and Leipzig and Berlin universities. As with counterparts elsewhere in East Central Europe these 'revisionist' Marxist intellectuals desired a reform of socialism, and took inspiration from the Yugoslav model: workers' councils, multi-candidate elections, profit-sharing for workers, an end to collectivisation and greater intellectual freedoms. Their ostensible leader, the brilliant young philosopher Wolfgang Harich, hoped in addition to achieve German unity through a joint SED-SPD platform.
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What made East German revisionists stand out against an East Central European background was not so much their ideas as their activities. These were characterised by unwavering loyalty to the Party. How these intellectuals imagined change to be possible without direct challenges to Ulbricht remains a mystery. Having worked for years in the Party they knew of its strict centralisation and hierarchical character, yet they refused to consider allies outside or even within the Party leadership: 90 neither they nor Ulbricht's Politbureau rivals considered making common cause.
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As loyal Party soldiers, East German revisionists wished not to be seen to be a faction, and they therefore ignored the rules of conspiracy. Perhaps the most important meeting of would-be opponents -the November 1956 gathering of editors Walter Janka, Gustav Just, Heinz Zoger with Wolfgang Harich, and Paul Merker in Klein-Machnow near Berlin -agreed to do nothing in order not to 'endanger the unity of the Party'. 92 Harich openly confided his plans to the Soviet Ambassador and to Ulbricht himself, and failed to consult his closest associates before underof'political and world view problems'. They were moved by the 'growth of intolerance in political life after the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising'. 93 Any group cohesion -for example of'the Harich-Janka group' -was an invention of Walter Ulbricht for use at trials that would intimidate other intellectuals. Such behavior very much contrasts with that of their Polish counterparts, for whom conspiracy and faction formation were ways of life, inherited from generations of foreign occupation.
After the summer of 1956, Ulbricht never lost the initiative. Events in neighbouring countries had reinforced his .conviction of the danger of intellectuals. The SED leadership decided that there was 'an organic agreement of the counterrevolutionary ideology' of East German revisionist intellectuals with that of the 'hostile' groups in Hungary and Poland. This could be explained only by the 'unified direction at the hand of the [class] enemy'. 94 Despite its fundamental subservience, Ulbricht therefore subjected the East German intelligentsia to waves of repression. The Western press tended to magnify his concerns, facilely identifying Bloch as the German Lukacs and Harich as the German Kofakowski.
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In November 1956, Harich became Ulbricht's first victim. He was accused of 'relations with the reactionary Petofi circle in Hungary'. 96 After thanking the Stasi for arresting him, Harich proved willing to co-operate fully in the Party's destruction of his mentors and friends, and implicated in particular Janka and Bloch. He reported, for example, that Bloch 'throughout the year 1956 worked himself into a position directly hostile towards the S.ED leadership'. 97 The next victims of the crackdown were Janka and his colleagues from the cultural weekly Sonntag, Gustav Just and Heinz Zoger.
Ulbricht then turned his attention to the circle around Ernst Bloch in Leipzig, where there had been vigorous discussions among young writers and students.
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According to writer Gerhard Zwerenz, in early 1956 the 'old Stalinists withdrew in confusion and indignation' and made no attempt to hinder the revisionists' activities.
99 Yet in the autumn, the bureaucrats' confidence returned and this 'group' quickly dissolved. 100 In March 1957, Ernst Bloch was compulsorily retired. His remaining students were 'strongly advised' to renounce their master. Some did, like Hans Pfeiffer. Jiirgen Teller did not and, in order to prove his worthiness, was sent to 'production' where an accident cost him his right arm. Giinter Zehm also Vol. 7, 24. 95 For SED reports on Harich and Bloch, with copious and annotated Western press cuttings, see SAPMO-BA, ZPA IV 2/9.04./162-3.
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In the words of Kantorowicz, to mention the Petofi-Club 'called forth the same reaction among party functionaries as did the mention of the devil among believers in the Middle Ages'. Tagebuch, 692.
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Guntolf Herzberg, 'Ernst Bloch in Leipzig: Der operative Vorgang "Wild" ', Zeitschrifi Jiir Ceschichtswissenschaft, Vol. 42, no. 8 (1994), 686. refused and was arrested.
101 Loest was likewise arrested, but Zwerenz managed to escape in time to West Berlin. In June 1957 a group of Slavicists from the university in Halle were arrested, and in September their 'leader', Ralf Schroeder, was seized. Like Harich, Schroeder proved willing to reveal every detail of the conspiracy known to him. 102 People who had been closest to the arrested refused to help their families financially.
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Most remained in prison well into the 1960s. After this point, the Ulbricht regime carried its offensive into the ranks of intellectuals who had never entertained the idea of political opposition, namely the social scientists. At risk were the few who had departed furthest from Stalinist dogmas in scholarship, and in some cases felt enthusiasm over events in Poland.
104 Even more than in the case of the 'Harich-Janka group', any conspiratorial character to these intellectuals' designs was a fabrication of the SED leadership, and in all but a few instances slight prodding was all that was needed to produce massive self-criticism. Prominent among Ulbricht's targets were historians. In general their response to the Twentieth Party Congress had been restrained; 103 nevertheless, the editorial board of their major journal, Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft, was reconstituted and used to discipline the GDR's foremost economic historian, Jiirgen Kuczynski.
Kuczynski later noted that all the leading East German historians (except Walter Markov) formed a 'united front' against him. 106 The attack was led by historian Fritz Kohler, not coincidental^ a man who had seemed moved by the revelations of Khrushchev. 107 In the conjuncture of 1957, perhaps feeling obliged to overcompensate for his past, 108 Kohler delivered to the Central Committee a series of damaging indictments on Kuczynski, claiming that he had been the true inspiration of revisionism in the GDR, and concocting a conspiracy between Kuczynski, the economist Fritz Behrens and the historian Joachim Streisand. Supposedly Streisand had close contacts with West Berlin.
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Despite some reservations as to Kohler's motives, the SED leadership used him to keep Kuczynski fending off pseudo-academic attacks -for example that he had denied the complicity of right-wing Social Democrats in Germany's entry to the First World War -for years.
110 Such a strategy was not limited to the historical community: simultaneously less gifted philosophers were mobilised against Ernst Bloch (Rugard Otto Gropp), and less gifted economists (Herbert Prauss) against Fritz Behrens and Arne Benary. As Kuczynski has lamented:
Real Marxists like Fritz Behrens, Walter Markov and myself, real progressive scholars like Hans Mayer and Ernst Bloch, were forced to debate with primitive scholarly figures that were promoted and encouraged by the Party. And the Party supported them, indeed directed them against us, especially in the person of Kurt Hager . . .
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In early 1957, a younger colleague at the Institute for Economics in Berlin supplied the SED Central Committee with detailed reports of conversations with Behrens and Benary, in which the former praised the Leninist period of Soviet history as a time when 'everyone could freely speak their opinion'. Soon these revisionists were forced to recognise a higher principle: in February Benary confessed that 'it has always been clear to me that the power of the working class stands and falls with the unity of the Party. Yet the discussions we had undoubtedly did nothing to promote the unity (Einheit und Geschlossenheit) of the Party, and therefore our political practice did not live up to this correct principle.'
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After dealing with historians and economists, Ulbricht took the assault to scholars of Marxism-Leninism, who were perhaps his truest allies in academe. 113 In 1958, the SED leadership decided to 'annihilate a group hostile to the Party' at Humboldt University's Institute of Social Sciences. One comrade, when told to examine her conscience, confessed to the deepest shame for having procured a copy of Khrushchev's speech from her aunt in the West: 'Today I see clearly that the only foundation is solid unlimited trust in our Party.'
114
What is remarkable in the behaviour of even the most daring 'revisionists' is the way in which slight pressure caused them to splinter, and often deny one another in the hope of regaining the Party's favour. Cases of solidarity with the victims are all but unknown, despite the supposed mass support their views enjoyed. Loest recalled the moments before he was expelled from the SED: 'He had known some of the people in the meeting for years. One person with whom he had played cards for years swore never to have been his friend. He encountered anger and disgust, sometimes feigned, sometimes real.' 115 When he fell into disfavour in 1953, Gerhard Zwerenz recalled that 'in the great city of Leipzig hardly a human being attempted to speak to him'. 116 Writer Wieland Herzfelde dared defend Zwerenz in a meeting in January 1957, but after a leading functionary called Zwerenz an enemy of the Party, he quickly asked for the podium again and avowed that he had 'not wanted to ally himself with enemies of the Party'. of the East German Writers' Union, Stefan Heym had dared to contradict Walter Ulbricht to his face. He later recalled the coffee break that followed:
An isolation as deadly as the one in which S.H. and his wife Gertrude found themselves in the whirl of the crowd during this half hour in the foyer of the congress hall is hardly imaginable outside really existing socialism. Only here is people's instinct so well developed for the dangerous glow radiated by a person under an official ban. A single person breaks through the invisible wall, and this not a German, but rather a Turk: Nazim Hikmet.
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Perhaps most poignant is the example of Walter Janka. Though they had enlisted his help in 'rescuing' Georg Lukacs from Budapest in November 1956, Johannes R. Becher and Anna Seghers refused to come to the aid of the editor who was arrested the following year. He later described the trial:
The writers in attendance, from Anna Seghers and Willi Bredel to Bodo Uhse, did not take part in the screaming. They remained silent. Their faces were pale. . . . The face of Heli Weigel, the widow of Brecht, who had shown Janka her sympathy by winking at him, had become ashen. She stared into space, full of consternation. The failure of even one of the friends of Lukacs who had come to the trial to protest the untrue allegations was for Janka the worst disappointment during the trial.
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Gustav Just likewise wondered at the failure of Janka's associates to speak a word in his defence: And where were Seghers, Bredel, Uhse and all the others in his time of trouble? I can report something positive about only one of them: Ludwig Renn. Shortly after Janka's arrest he came to me in the editorial office. He was angry, but was able to control himself in his typically reserved way. He asked me how he could send Janka a pack of cigarettes with his best greetings. I advised him to try the state prosecutor's office. As Janka later told me, he received the greetings. What that can mean for a prisoner who feels abandoned by everyone, one can only imagine.
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Party and non-Party intellectuals alike had internalised the Leninist interdiction of factions. Jiirgen Kuczynski, even decades after the fact, felt proud to have prevented his students from forming a school. In correspondence and discussions with the Party powerful, Ernst Bloch denied the school that had formed around him.
121 And after In a discussion with Central Committee functionaries on 25 Jan. 1957, Bloch quickly distanced himself from students Zehm and Kleine, professing he could not be held 'responsible for their thinking'. SAPMO IV2/9.04/163/28. Three days earlier he wrote to the Rector of Karl-Marx-University, G. Mayer, that when: 'the Horthy regime was on the rise in Hungary, I told the head of the institute: "It's high time now. When will the Red Army finally march in?" ' He further wrote of his 'deep differences' with the arrested Wolfgang Harich, and emphasised the care he had taken to hire only graduate students who belonged to the SED, 'this in distinct contrast to other institutes at die KarlMarx-University'. Ibid., IV2/9.04/163/15-26. In Dec. 1957, Bloch wrote In fact, the SED hoped that discontented intellectuals would leave. In 1949, Anton Ackermann spoke to leading functionaries about the 'serious problem' of 'emigration of intellectuals', but admitted to distinctions: 'When a reactionary philosopher or historian leaves the Eastern Zone, this only makes us happy. But it's different with physicians, mathematicians, physicists, biologists or technicians, whom we need and cannot replace.'
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The border thus served a double function: harmful when skilled labour escaped, but beneficial when it permitted the draining away of potential resistance. The SED was the only Communist Party in the Soviet Bloc which could dispose of 'bourgeois' intellectuals in this way; the other parties had to make some sort of compromise.
The open border also made the East German intelligentsia the sole intelligentsia in Europe which had chosen socialism in full consciousness of the realities of East and West. French intellectuals were Stalinists ignorant of Stalinism; Russian or Romanian intellectuals were Stalinists ignorant of the West. This made East German intellectuals' adherence to socialism frequently fanatical. Looking upon the 'restorationist Adenauer regime' of the 1950s, they were convinced that they chose either socialism or fascism. Perhaps the best-known East German dissident, the chemist Robert Havemann, had been deeply affected by the Twentieth Party Congress. But that changed nothing in his perceptions of the evils of the West, and the need to use Stalinist methods to enforce the Party's understanding of what was right. In June 1957, he attended an election meeting at which a student alleged that the GDR was not democratic enough. In response Havemann said that in comparison with West Germany we have practically ideal democratic conditions. He explained this thoroughly and well. It came down to the difference between a prison cell and a good life in which one occasionally gets angry about the refrigerator that keeps going on the blink. Then comrade Havemann got very sharp and said that students who had not understood this after all these years should go work in a factory so that they would understand it.
Erich Loest wrote many years later of his difficulty in deciding to escape from East Germany, even under imminent threat of arrest. He remained:
He did not know an alternative. It would have been unthinkable for him to go to West Germany. For him that was Adenauer's capitalist, revanchist state; that was where former Nazi teachers had gone and were receiving fat pension cheques, that was where the Blutrichter of Freisler still meted out justice ... to him, even the most tedious[strapazios] socialism seemed far more moral and to have a much greater future than the most perfect economic miracle.
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Gerhard Zwerenz battled with himself throughout the summer of 1957 over whether to escape arrest by fleeing to West Berlin. He grew darkly sun-tanned during weeks spent camping at public lakes in East Berlin. Despite the risk of prison, Zwerenz returned to Leipzig, where only the coaxing of Karola Bloch could convince him at last to slip away to West Berlin. The case of Bloch's student Giinter Zehm is perhaps more impressive. During the summers Zehm had traveDed throughout the West, attending the seminars of Merleau-Ponty in Paris, discussing existentialism in West Germany and touring Italy. Upon his return to Leipzig he found the dialectical materialism there 'poor and antiquated'. Yet this only intensified his drive to reform socialism in East Germany. When arrested in 1957 by the Stasi I looked upon the cops, who pressed me into the car and sat to my right and left holding a pillow over my hands so that no one from the street could see the hand-cuffs, in a certain sense as allies. In the weeks [leading up to the arrest] I had been expelled from the Party, had been forced to leave the university, denied all possibilities of a bourgeois existence, so that I had to work as a peon for a writer. All this injustice had not sufficiently opened my eyes. Only in prison would Communism literally be beaten out of me. I wanted to debate with the interrogating commissars, and they answered with their fists. What a lesson I learned! . . . How my eyes now were opened to the real quality of the German Democratic Republic. How much did I learn in the following years, when murderers and executioners, whom the regime had hired as guards, spied on me, when I was watched over by threatening machine guns and ferocious dogs, and had nothing to read throughout my captivity except Neues Deutschland, the central organ of the SED! 133 Zehm later became an editor for the conservative daily Die Welt. Yet for most of Ulbricht's leading victims, years of prison had not been enough to shake their allegiance to the Party: Harich, Schroeder, Janka, Just, Merker, Dahlem, Schirdewan and Hermstadt all refused to criticise the SED during its reign. They feared upsetting 'Party unity'. Such Leninist loyalty drew sustenance from German political culture's 'conventional unpolitical attitude '. 134 The open border had helped concentrate the leftist and apolitical traditions of German political culture in one small part. A grotesque example of this combination was related to Gustav Just by the writer Kurt Bartel (who liked to be called 'KuBa'):
I remembered that KuBa, full of enthusiasm, once told me about comrades who had returned from the Soviet Union and spent fifteen years or more in jails and camps though they had done nothing. Their first path had been to the Central Committee: 'Comrades, I'm back! What would you like me to do now?' Perhaps there is something exalted in such behaviour, but I do not understand this mentality. For me, these are inhabitants of a different planet.
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Just may not have 'understood this mentality', but he shared it. He waited until 1989 before releasing memoirs written in the 1960s that seemed critical of'socialism' -and the Party.
Conclusion
The year 1956 was a year of heated debate and quiet hope in the German Democratic Republic. Perhaps more than any other year in that country's history, it was a year of the intellectuals. They embodied widely held aspirations for change. Yet the intellectual ferment of 1956 achieved nothing concrete, and even failed to leave traces in the East German collective memory.
The most important factor in accounting for this outcome was the Ulbricht regime. Through a mixture of incentives and terror it kept intellectual opposition divided; and it pursued this policy consistently from the early post-war days. The SED leadership also methodically created its own intelligentsia from 1946 onwards, and had achieved impressive results by the early 1950s. East German students were more often drawn from the lower classes, and were more often beneficiaries of state aid, than counterparts elsewhere in the region. During periods of political instability they tended to side with the regime. To return to the analysis of William E. Griffith, one might say that the SED resolved the tension between the apparat and intelligentsia by making the two one.
The East German leadership also formed an intelligentsia in the negative sense, and here it had special advantages: the open border permitted discontented 'bourgeois' elements to emigrate freely for over fifteen years. The GDR was the only country in Europe where Communists chose the East in full knowledge of both East and West. The precise function of the open border is one of the most pressing questions in the historical sociology of the GDR, but preliminary research does suggest that people who were more highly educated were over-represented among those 'fleeing the Republic'.
136 Even after the building of the Wall the regime continued to force dissent westward, and policed entrance to universities almost as carefully as to the Party itself. Dissident challenges of later decades came from outside the Party, from people who had been denied higher education and socially marginalised.
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The Soviet Military Administration was central to this double-edged strategy of intelligentsia creation. It could requisition buildings and other supplies necessary to 135 Just, Ztuge, 116. 1 In 1961 3.4 per cent of the male population of West Germany was university-educated. Of the male refugees from East Germany, the percentage was 7.2. Helge Heidemeyer, Flucht und Zuwanderung aus dor SBZ/DDR 1945 /1949 -1961 (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1994 J. Fuchs, R. Jahn, K. Weiss, U. Poppe and G. Jeschonnek all had their path to higher education blocked; the careers of W. Templin and G. Poppe in the Academy of Sciences were terminated. See the biographies in Torpey, Intellectuals, running the early worker preparation courses (Vorstudienanstalteri), and through its security arm helped eliminate opposition to the SED, arresting between 1946 and 1949 the leaders of the Berlin, Leipzig and Rostock student bodies. Nowhere else in East Central Europe did the Soviets become so directly involved in policies of elite formation.
The dynamic of the split nation had not forced these aggressive policies of intelligentsia formation upon the SED. As with other parties in the region, the SED faced alternatives in building a socialist society; it chose to realise the potentials of education for building socialism. Precisely why the Party's leaders, and in particular Walter Ulbricht, valued education and so acutely sensed the dangers of intellectual dissent, remain subjects for further study.
Finally, the East German regime inherited the legacies of an apolitical intellectual community, which felt primary loyalty to the state and Party. No doubt the 'myth of anti-fascism' helped cement these intellectuals' devotion to Party unity, but the East Central European context reveals this factor as by no means decisive. Unlike counterparts elsewhere in the region, the East German intelligentsia had no existence separate from the Party.
